Opening Speech by the Communist Party of Turkey

ECA Teleconference on “The EU, NATO, and other imperialist alliances: ‘Security providers’ or frameworks for deeper military involvement at the expense of the people?” 

Opening speech of Kemal Okuyan, General Secretary of Communist Party of Turkey

6 September 2026

 

Today, I would like to provide a general overview of Turkey’s evolving political and strategic orientation in the aftermath of the NATO summit, with particular attention to some of the key developments that have emerged since then.

Since the NATO summit, the integration of Turkey’s rapidly expanding defense industry into the broader NATO framework appears to have accelerated considerably. Turkey is becoming increasingly integrated into the European wing of NATO through countries such as Spain, Italy, Poland, and Romania, and, step by step, Germany as well. Britain, although outside the European Union, also constitutes an important part of this process.

This development should not be viewed solely through the lens of unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. The Turkish defense industry is becoming increasingly integrated into the broader Western military-industrial structure across a wide range of fields. Turkish companies are also developing partnerships and joint ventures with American firms. From this perspective, the integration of Turkey’s defense industry represents a broader process than simply the export of particular weapons systems.

Turkey’s military relationship with Ukraine also deserves attention in this context. Ankara’s involvement goes beyond commercial trade and includes forms of military assistance. The relationship is not limited to drones;Turkey is also planning to export and supply missiles. Some of these missiles are originally American products that were previously stocked in Turkey and are now scheduled to be sent to Ukraine if Turkey does not respond positively to the Russian protests.

Developments in the energy sector provide another indication of Turkey’s changing relationship with Russia. Following the war in Ukraine, Turkey began importing natural gas from the United States, in line with a broader tendency observed among a number of European countries. More recently, Turkey has also reduced its imports of Russian crude oil. For the first time in Turkish history, in June, the United States became the main exporter of crude oil to Turkey. Previously, this position had been occupied by Russia. Taken together, these developments suggest that Turkey is moving away from its previous level of relations on Russia at a relatively rapid pace.

The continuing war in the Black Sea adds another dimension to this picture. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have carried out attacks affecting Turkish ships, while Turkey continues to maintain commercial relations with both sides. Turkish vessels use the Port of Odesa in Ukraine as well as Russian ports in the Black Sea. There have also been reports of Turkish workers and sailors losing their lives in connection with these incidents. What is particularly noteworthy from this perspective is the relatively restrained response of the Turkish government to such incidents. This creates a significant contradiction in Turkey’s current position. Turkey is providing drones and other military equipment to Ukraine, while the continuation of the war is simultaneously exposing Turkish workers and sailors to considerable risks.

This also helps explain why Ukraine has been putting pressure on Turkey. Kyiv has been calling on Ankara to suspend its economic relations with Russia. Yet such a step would be extremely difficult to implement in practice.

Turkey’s relationship with Russia extends far beyond the energy sector. The two countries maintain substantial agricultural trade, with Turkey both importing from and exporting to Russia. Tourism is another particularly important component of this relationship. Large numbers of Russian citizens, as well as wealthy Ukrainians, continue to visit Turkey for tourism.

At the same time, Turkey’s geographical position in the Black Sea gives it a particularly significant strategic role. Turkey controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. If Ankara were to take a more decisive initiative concerning these straits, Russia could potentially find itself heavily constrained within the Black Sea. Such a development would constitute a major strategic challenge for Russia, particularly given the weakening of its previous strategic position and the loss of its bases in Syria. An inability of the Russian navy to pass through the Turkish straits would therefore create a serious strategic problem for Moscow.

Against this broader background, Turkey appears to be moving more clearly in opposition to both Russia and Iran following the NATO summit. This raises the possibility that Turkey could become more directly involved in regional conflicts in the period ahead.

The so-called Mecca Agreement can also be considered within this broader regional reconfiguration. It is not a formal treaty but an agreement, and the full details of the arrangement are not publicly known. What has attracted particular attention is the announcement of a principle comparable to NATO’s Article 5, according to which there would be a collective response if one of the participating countries were attacked.

The agreement has been publicly presented in connection with attacks originating from Yemen. From a political perspective, however, it can also be interpreted as a clear signal directed against Iran.

From this perspective, Turkey’s increasingly pronounced positioning vis-à-vis Russia and Iran after the NATO summit may indicate a broader strategic shift. It is possible that Turkey is entering a period in which its involvement in regional conflicts becomes more direct.

This development can be characterized as broadly compatible with American strategic interests, although it contains a number of contradictions. Turkish capitalism also has its own intentions and perspectives. What has been described for years as Neo-Ottomanism represents one dimension of these ambitions. At the same time, the broader strategic framework appears to be closely connected to the policies and interests of the United States and Britain.

Within this framework, the United States appears to be making effective use of the conflicts and rivalries among its regional allies. Turkey’s position provides a particularly clear example.

Turkey’s principal regional rival is Iran, but Ankara also competes with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. Tensions between Turkey and Israel have increased considerably, and at the surface level there is an evident political conflict between the two countries. From another perspective, however, both continue to operate within a broader strategic framework that serves American interests. Their competition can therefore also be understood as taking place within that framework.

A similar dynamic can be observed in the relationship between Turkey and Greece. Both countries are American allies, and for many years American imperialism has made effective use of the tensions between them. Washington has been able to exert influence on both sides by emphasizing that alternative options and alternative partners remain available.

The interpretation of the latest Mecca Agreement as an anti-American initiative, however, does not appear to account for this broader context. One possible explanation is that the participating countries have recognized a growing gap between what the United States declares and what it is capable of implementing in practice. At the same time, Washington appears to be encouraging its allies to assume greater responsibility for certain aspects of the political and military agenda themselves.

For this reason, the Mecca Agreement may be better understood not as an anti-American decision or as an independent geopolitical movement by the three countries, but as an initiative that remains broadly compatible with the strategic framework established by the United States. This does not mean that the participating countries lack their own intentions or interests. Each country is clearly pursuing its own objectives within this broader framework.

Why has Turkey decided to change its approach toward Russia? Even during the Soviet period, Turkey was very careful in its relations with Russia. But now there is a significant shift.

The United States and other European countries are certainly exerting considerable pressure. However, there is another important reason. Neo-Ottomanism is about transforming Turkey to a regional imperial power.One of its instruments is religion, while another is national identity.

When we look at Turkey's surrounding geography, we see not only Arab and Kurdish realities but also the former republics of the Soviet Union, which contain large Turkish-speaking populations.

Inside the Russian Federation alone, there are approximately 13 million Turkish-speaking people. They are not concentrated in a single region. In the former Soviet republics, there are approximately 80 million Turkish-speaking people.

The Turkish state, and particularly the AKP government, sees this as an opportunity because Russia has become weaker in the region. At the same time, during the war in Ukraine, the proportion of Muslim and Turkish-speaking populations within the Russian army is increasing. One reason is that birth rates are higher among these societies.

Therefore, Turkey is playing a broader geopolitical game. This does not necessarily mean that it will be successful, but it will certainly try.

So, Neo-Ottomanism is not only related to Syria and Iraq.

The developments surrounding the peace process should likewise be examined within this broader context.

The PKK has long been lost its revolutionary character if it had any, but for various historical and political reasons, there have been significant mystifications surrounding the Kurdish nationalist movement. The current political process has also raised questions about the relationship that has developed between Öcalan and Erdoğan. The fundamental point is that the PKK was never a genuinely Marxist organization.

The Kurdish movement, and particularly Öcalan’s political approach, can increasingly be interpreted as becoming a component of the broader Neo-Ottomanist policy. At the same time, there is increasing pressure on left-wing forces, with the suggestion that those who oppose this process may face exclusion from Turkish political life.

This represents a particularly interesting political experience. It illustrates how an ethnic or nationalist organization can potentially be utilized by the capitalist class as an instrument in both regional and domestic politics.

For the communist movement, this issue therefore requires a particularly careful and principled approach, especially given the international dimensions and political connections surrounding it.

I hope this framework has been useful in providing a broader understanding of the developments in Turkey and the wider regional context.

I wish you a fruitful meeting.